Is a metonymy always a metonymy? A speculation on taxonomical aspects of
propositional metonymy and situational metonymy
Nikolay Golovko1,*
1North Caucasus
Federal University, Humanities Institute, 355009, 1 Pushkin
street, Stavropol, Russia
Abstract. Research efforts in cognitive linguistics are
frequently focused on the notion of metaphor, while the notion of metonymy, as
well as its taxonomical aspects, is not always thoroughly researched. A study
of the most recent research papers in the English language has shown that
metonymy is often interpreted in a broad fashion, incorporating several different
types of cognitive processes and phenomena, so that a scholar becomes unable to
distinguish them from each other and / or is essentially forced to regard them
as manifestations of the same phenomenon. A more taxonomically accurate
approach is suggested, involving the use of the term “synecdoche” for
affinity-related concept shifts and including a review of two subclasses of
metonymy that have not yet received a considerable amount of attention –
propositional metonymy and situational metonymy.
1 Introduction
Research efforts in the field of cognitive linguistics
are frequently concentrated on questions and problems that are related to
essence, functions and representations of metaphors, as well as to natural
language processing operations on them. However, other referential means are
still attracting less attention, even though there definitely is an amount of
research in these adjacent areas. One of such means is the phenomenon of
metonymy. Historically, it has been analyzed and reviewed by certain authors,
of whom the following can be singled out: Lakoff (1987), Kövecses and Radden (1998),
Panther and Thornburg (1999), Warren (1999), Mendoza Ibáñez and Campo (2001), Barcelona (2003), Deignan
(2005), Denroche (2015). In the recent years, comprehensive theoretical
research on metonymy has been relatively rare, conditioning several problems
that will be presented further in the paper.
During our review of recent proceedings and
findings dedicated to cognitive linguistics, studies on metaphors and other
associated subjects, we have discovered references to several theoretical
developments on the notion of metonymy that are still not explored well. In
particular, we wanted to focus our attention on two exotic subclasses of
metonymy suggested by Mendoza Ibáñez and Campo (2001), i.e. propositional metonymy and situational metonymy. We
could not find any recent substantial research on these two categories, while
we believe that they require rather serious consideration in terms of whether
they should indeed be regarded as manifestations of metonymy.
Whereas the metaphor is receiving a more or
less uniform approach to its features and definition, and its researchers appear
to generally agree on the idea that it represents transfer of qualities between
two objects based on similarity between them, metonymy often lacks accurate interpretation.
As far as studies on it are less frequent, the unrefined condition of this aspect
of theory is understandable. Still, it is important to clarify definitions,
because our analysis suggests that various authors have been expanding the
notion of metonymy towards concepts and phenomena that do not belong to it. The
partially indefinite status of metonymy is the first problem to be explored.
The second problem consists in limited
research available on two subclasses of metonymy, propositional metonymy and
situational metonymy. It is our belief that existing suggestions to distinguish
these categories of metonymical transfer are not entirely accurate, and we find
it possible to claim that these concepts were grounded by an expansive
interpretation of metonymy, allowing the respective authors to link this notion
with phenomena that lie beyond its limits. In particular, the concepts appear
to stem from understanding metonymy as “part instead of whole” type of
relationship, while, for example, the Russian linguistic and literary tradition
(that we belong to) separates such references from the notion of metonymy and
singles them out as an independent device known as synecdoche.
The statement of these two problems leads
us to formulation of certain research questions, listed in the following part
of this article.
The initial research question is whether
the scholars who have been studying the language means of metonymy during the
recent years are establishing their research on a reliable interpretation of
this term. In order to be able to respond to this question, we will need to
review definitions of metonymy that are found in actual research articles and
analyze them critically, as well as suggest a refined interpretation in case of
necessity. The secondary question is related to two aforementioned subclasses
of metonymy; we intend to check whether propositional metonymy and situational
metonymy are in harmony with the most accurate definition of metonymy as a
linguistic, communicative and cognitive phenomenon that we will be able to
provide.
The choice of research questions determines
the purpose of this study, as well as materials and methods that we will need
to use.
The ultimate purpose of this study is to
either confirm or suggest to revise the status of propositional metonymy and
situational metonymy on the basis of analyzing and refining the definition of
metonymy itself. As far as materials and methods are concerned, they can be
found in the next section of the paper.
2 Materials and Methods
Achievement of the purpose
of this study may be possible through the following procedures:
1) We would collect open-access research
papers on metonymy that were published in the recent 3 years (since 2016) and
indexed in any of the Web of Science core databases. We would then review the
theoretical approaches to metonymy that are found in these papers, analyze them
and compare against the traditional Russian academic and scientific
interpretation that we are used to rely on. We would also try to formulate an
improved definition of the term, based on the results of this analysis and
comparison.
2) We would cross-reference the refined
definition of metonymy with the concepts of propositional metonymy and
situational metonymy, that we are particularly interested in. Through resulting
speculation and reflection on accuracy of these terms, as they are suggested by
Mendoza Ibáñez and Campo (2001), we would work towards a critical
evaluation of these concepts, and of the degree of their relationship to
metonymy in particular.
3 Discussion
3.1. The definition of metonymy in recent research
In accord with the criteria that we have
defined in the previous section of the paper, 10 research articles have been
extracted and analyzed.
Arijana Krišković in Metonymic and non-metonymic use of names for
branches of medical science in English and Croatian: a cognitive linguistic
analysis (2016) relies on Lakoff (1987) and Barcelona (2003) in their
interpretation of metonymy, stating that it is a cognitive mechanism in which
an element of one domain is interpreted in terms of another domain, included in
the same shared experiential domain [1].
Lewis Bott, Alice Rees and Steven Frisson
in The Time Course of Familiar Metonymy (2016)
define metonymy as “a form of figurative language in which people refer to an
entity (e.g., the institution governing a hospital) by a salient property of
the entity (e.g., a hospital)” [2].
Aseel Zibin’s On the production of metaphors and metonymies by Jordanian EFL
learners: acquisition and implications (2016) makes
use of a definition from Deignan (2005), suggesting that metonymy should be
regarded as “indirect reference, or reference shift, in which a linguistic sign
refers not [only] to its default concept A, but to another concept B, within a
single cognitive domain” [3].
In Maria M. Piñango’s Metonymy as referential dependency:
psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic arguments for a unified linguistic
treatment (2016), it is claimed that “metonymy appears as a general type of
semantic relation that allows a given term to be used to refer not to its
original denotation, but to another denotation which is conversationally
informative and one with which it holds some kind of functional correspondence”
[4].
Sara Quintero Ramírez in Metonymy as a cohesion tool in sports
newspaper articles (2017) is quoting Denroche (2015), building their
understanding of metonymy on the idea that it is “the highlighting of
relatedness, usually part-whole, between closely-related concepts, things and
signifiers” [5].
Lidija Orčić and Sabina
Zenejlagić in Metonymic and
metaphoric extensions of the expression “keep an eye on somebody/something”
(2018) are also relying on Lakoff’s ideas. In particular, the researchers are
using the phrase which states that metonymy “allows us to use one entity to
stand for another” [6]. They also add the idea from Warren (1999), emphasizing
the notion of contiguity as the core aspect of metonymy.
El Mustapha Lemghari in Le nom propre en lecture qualitative
: de la métonymie à la métaphtonymie (2018) is
concentrating on differences between qualitative metonymy and quantitative
metonymy. They refer to Gary-Prieur (1994) and seem to interpret the notion of
metonymy as the name shift between entities of different orders (primary /
secondary) [7].
Jo Van Herwegen and Gabriella Rundblad in A cross-sectional and longitudinal study of
novel metaphor and metonymy comprehension in children, adolescents, and adults
with autism spectrum disorder (2018) do not appear to provide a definition
of metonymy; however, they distinguish “object-user” metonyms and “synecdoche
metonyms” as separate notions [8].
Ana Belén Cabrejas-Peñuelas
in Metonymy in Spanish and American parliamentary
speeches: Obama’s State of the Union address versus Rajoy’s State of the Nation
address (2018) is relying on definition from Kövecses & Radden
(1998), in accord with which metonymy is a “cognitive process in which one
conceptual entity, the vehicle [or source], provides mental access to another
conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or I(dealized)
C(ognitive) M(odel)” [9].
Jeannette Littlemore and Caroline Tagg in Metonymy and Text Messaging: A Framework for
Understanding Creative Uses of Metonymy (2018) are interpreting metonymy as
“the use of one entity, process or event to refer to another related entity,
process or event” [10].
Thus, there appears to be a consensus that concepts
undergoing metonymic modifications are related to each other in a certain way.
However, the essence of this relationship is rarely specified, and the authors
seem to intentionally use broad phrasing in order to embrace the widest scope
of phenomena possible. As a result, a considerable number of different relationships,
such as “part-whole”, “producer-product”, “object-user”, “effect-cause” etc.,
becomes associated with metonymy.
The Russian linguistic and literary
tradition interprets metonymy as a reference based on contiguity. On the
wording level, this representation of the term is close to Warren’s idea quoted
in (Orčić 2018). Nonetheless, we find it possible to claim that the
understanding of “contiguity” may differ across various scientific traditions.
The definitions of metonymy that we found in publications in the English
language appear to regard contiguity as the condition of being closely related
on any basis. Lakoff’s fundamental idea of entities belonging to the same
cognitive domain can be used as an example: essentially, it represents another
way to speak about contiguity. Otherwise saying, any subjects and / or objects
that are somehow adjacent to each other may be called contiguous and thus may
be subject to a metonymical shift. On the other hand, for a Russian researcher
the idea of “contiguity” is more or less limited to that of spatial connection,
where entities are located immediately next to each other; a typical example
would be The entire room laughed, where the chamber
is used as a reference to people occupying it.
Another aspect of this comparison between
the Russian tradition and recent interpretations from the research in the
English language would be the special status of “part-whole” relationship
observed in the latter. We are used to the idea of singling out the referential
means known as synecdoche for this certain variant of connection between
subjects, objects or phenomena. As seen in (Herwegen & Rundblad 2018), the
notion of synecdoche is not alien to English-speaking scholars. At the same
time, Denroche’s quotation from (Ramirez 2017) clearly links this kind of
relationship with metonymy.
There is, undoubtedly, an idea that
synecdoche is a part of metonymical shifts and should thus be regarded as a
subclass of metonymy. However, we would like to agree with Ken-ichi Seto, who
argued in Distinguishing metonymy from
synecdoche (1999) that it is an independent device based on a different
type of reference [11]. The researcher emphasized the contrast between spatial
/ temporal nature of metonymic transfers and categorial nature of synecdoche;
we believe that this consideration is noteworthy.
The core matter of this situation is not
about mere terminological or taxonomical nuances, as it may seem upon the first
glance. We are dealing with different types of relationships between objects or
phenomena, and consequently, with different cognitive models, operations, and
correlations. Therefore, whenever these relationships are studied within the
context of cognitive linguistics, it is important to separate them: contiguity,
or the condition of being adjacent in time and / or space, is not equal to
“whole-part” association, as the former may imply a coincidental nature of the
connection between them, whereas the latter always conveys the idea of
“affinity”, a sort of internal cohesion.
In a research paper on metonymy, there was
the following example: Bush sent troops
to Iraq. If we compare it to similar phrase Washington (D.C.) sent troops to Iraq, we will observe a certain
difference: the second phrase is more abstract, referring to “people who are
located in Washington” by the name of the capital of the United States, while
the first phrase is more concrete, in part through the use of reference to
George W. Bush, who is a human and consequently a part of the American nation.
We find it possible to claim that Washington
sent troops to Iraq contains implication “the U.S. government decided so”,
but Bush sent troops to Iraq may
imply “the American people decided so”.
The previous example that we have provided,
The entire room laughed, is also a good
sample to illustrate this idea. The individuals who are located in the room are
not a part of it, so they do not inherit any of its qualities, as they do not
have any affinity or kinship with it. Thus, their experience of laughing is not
derived from the room or conditioned by it; the audience would have laughed in
exactly the same manner in any other room. However, if we modify one of the
reviewed authors’ examples and say The suits would just
laugh at this, such a statement would emphasize the non-coincidental and regular
essence of the event, implying that the reaction of laughter is related to the
formal style of clothing (which is in turn derived from the people’s social
roles and positions).
In this respect, we suggest to limit the
notion of metonymy to spatial and / or temporal transfers, as well as other
relationships that do not involve a direct causal connection between objects or
phenomena. As far as the transfers based upon conditioned relationships, and
the “part-whole” relationships in particular, are concerned, we find it possible
to suggest to distinguish them from the notion of metonymy, as well as
persistently use the term “synecdoche”, because this variant of relationship
may be associated with different cognitive mechanisms and should thus be
studied separately. Other kinds of relationship might also be reviewed in this respect: for example, the “effect-cause”
relationship implies derivation rather than temporal contiguity.
In addition, we find it worthy of
emphasizing that in order to remain within the region of cognitive linguistics,
one should add language-related references to their definitions. A definition
stating that metonymy is a process where one entity is used instead of another
is, in our opinion, more suitable for psychology or other related disciplines;
in terms of linguistics, it might have been more accurate to state that name of one entity is used instead of
another (the definitions provided by Deignan or Piñango are good examples).
3.2 The notions of propositional metonymy and situational
metonymy
It appears to us that the notions of
propositional metonymy and situational metonymy were suggested by Ruiz de
Mendoza Ibáñez and Otal Campo in High-level metonymy and linguistic structure (2001). Describing the
first of these terms, the authors state that it applies when “a concept stands
for another in a domain-internal relationship” and provide an example of “face
for person” relationship, with ‘face’ being a subdomain of ‘person’. As far as
the second term is concerned, they characterize it through the situations where
“a highly striking or otherwise significant element of a specific situation is
used to stand for the larger event of which it forms part” [12]. It seems that
the authors designed these notions to complement the taxonomy of referential,
predicative and illocutionary metonymy suggested by other scholars.
In these statements, the idea of broader
interpretation of metonymy is implemented; it is evident that both the example
of propositional metonymy and the definition of situational metonymy are
formulated with the “whole-part” relationship in mind. It would have been
inappropriate to say that this approach is incorrect; it only follows a
theoretical concept that was positively accepted and is still broadly used in
the linguistic research in the English language. However, in the light of our
previously described considerations, we find it possible to argue that first of
all, these notions should be associated with synecdoche rather than with
metonymy, as, once again, the relationship between the whole and its parts is
different from the idea of contiguity conveyed by metonymical transfers.
In their example 2a, Mendoza
Ibáñez and Campo suggest the following illustration of
propositional metonymy: Tired faces all
of them, some old, some young. Undoubtedly, an individual’s facial
expression is conditioned by their emotional and physical state and derived
from it, so this state is transmitted through an object that constitutes a part
of said individual rather than through objects that are merely adjacent to
them. In our opinion, this situation indicates that the broad interpretation of
metonymy might not always be beneficial for researches in cognitive
linguistics; at least, the relationship between A and B where both A and B
belong to the same domain should be distinguished from the relationship where A
is a subdomain of B.
The
second part of the same illustration, Blufton
smiled with pleasure and kept searching for their faces (example 2b), is to
an extent different. We believe that it might need to be reconsidered in terms
of whether it is indeed a transfer of any kind. This statement can be interpreted
in a straightforward manner: the subject might have indeed been looking for
faces, so it is somewhat open to argument whether ‘face’ is used here as an
actual reference to an individual or as only a direct object of the person’s
mental activity.
For the notion of situational metonymy, the
authors give an example of The poor dog left with
its tail between its legs and suggest that a fragment of the scene (the
animal moving away in a certain manner) is expanded into a larger picture where
the dog undergoes certain negative experience resulting in this characteristic
behavior. We personally regard this example, as well as the suggested notion itself,
as dubious.
On one hand, there is no doubt in relation
to the fact that language is tightly linked with thought and with ways of
thinking. This enables the authors to define propositional metonymy via the
notion of concept (“one concept stands for another”), and thus the idea of
situational metonymy becomes a more or less simple expansion of the term:
instead of “concept”, a broader “situation” is manifested. Mendoza
Ibáñez and Campo are by no means alone in their interpretation of
metonymy: in the definitions we have previously listed, many scholars are regarding
metonymy as a cognitive process rather than a linguistic phenomenon, and
consequently, they represent it more immediately, as a concept shift rather
than a name shift. It would have been challenging to argue against the approach
of going deeper, right into the cognitive processes, beneath the surface of linguistic
reflection of these processes; however, the linguistic part of the equation should
not be put aside entirely.
On the other hand, whereas a concept is a
result of a cognitive process (such as generalization of available facts about
the environment and selection of characteristic features that would separate
the concept from any other and constitute its content), is usually performed
via language and is associated with a verbal identifier, a situation is not
necessarily of such a “conceptual” nature. It is often a single concrete
representative of a class rather than the class itself. Simply put, there is a
fundamental difference between “face” as a concept and a certain given face as
a representative of this concept: human thinking accumulates and amasses many
examples of individual faces and generalizes this information through cognitive
processes into a concept. Likewise, a situation we observe and perceive (the
dog was punished and left with its tail between its legs) is a single event
rather than a result of a cognitive process (even though there definitely exist
cognitive activities related to its perception and representation in memory and
conscience).
In addition, whenever linguistic terms,
such as “metonymy”, are used, they should be linked with language-related
phenomena. Otherwise, as we stated above, there is a risk of leaving the “Linguistics”
part of “Cognitive Linguistics” behind. We experience difficulties when trying
to see a linguistic phenomenon in using a part of a situation to refer to the
situation itself; it is, beyond doubt, a cognitive phenomenon, but the
application of linguistic terms to it looks far-fetched to an extent. The same
objection might be suggested against definitions where metonymy is interpreted
as the use of one event instead of another: substitutions between events and
their parts, in our opinion, is not exactly the same compared to using the
verbal identifier of one event in order to denote another. This area requires
additional consideration.
4 Conclusions
The following conclusions can be derived:
1) In the current research in the English
language, the concept of metonymy is interpreted broadly and embraces several
different cognitive relationships between objects or phenomena. For example,
the idea of contiguity (the state of being adjacent in time or space) is mixed
with the notion of affinity (the state of providing or receiving inherited,
shared or otherwise conditioned properties). It might be taxonomically and
academically beneficial to separate these variants and single the
affinity-based relationships out under the name of synecdoche. In case of
limiting the scope of metonymy to spatial and temporal shifts, the status of some
other relationships, such as “object-user” or “effect-cause”, would require further analysis and probable
reconsideration.
2) The notions of propositional metonymy
and situational metonymy, suggested by Mendoza Ibáñez and Campo,
are completely based upon the relationship of affinity (“whole-part”) by their definitions, while the adjacent notions of
referential, predicative and illocutionary metonymy do not presuppose such
limitations and may imply other types of relationships. It may be advised to
separate them taxonomically (i.e. use terms such as propositional synecdoche instead).
3) The notion of situational metonymy
involves phenomena that appear to lie beyond the scope of linguistics: it leaves the area of relationships
between language signs and their meanings or references, and it enters the area
of relationships between mental images and / or observed events taking place in
the environment. Even though a verbal description of situations
and their fragments can be regarded as a complex language sign, the idea of
using linguistic terms, such as “metonymy” or “synecdoche”, in this context might
be regarded as objectionable, so future research in this area may be suggested.
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